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THE DEMOCRATIZING EFFECTS OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS’ ACCESS TO 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
Theresa Squatrito 
Forthcoming, Global Governance 
 
Abstract: How should we evaluate international courts in terms of their effect on democratic 
deficits in international law-making? This article takes an initial step toward understanding how 
ICs improve or weaken the presence of democratic values in international law-making, focusing 
on one aspect of international courts – access for transnational actors (TNAs). This article 
argues that TNA access to international courts provides institutional mechanisms for 
participation and transparency. As widely accepted democratic values, the participation and 
transparency advanced by TNA access has democratizing effects for international law-making.  
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Introduction 
 
International law has developed to be a prominent component of global governance.1 Some 
observers of this development argue that international law-making does not reflect the values 
of collective self-governance and suffers from democratic deficits.2 Such arguments often rest 
on the assumption that international law-making is dominated by states, with limited input from 
those affected by the rules states adopt. Yet, international courts and tribunals (ICs) have grown 
in number and are widely recognized as important architects of international law. Against this 
backdrop, we can see that a significant gap in debates about the democratic deficits in 
international law-making arises from the lack of attention to international courts. How should 
we evaluate the performance of international courts in terms of their effect on the democratic 
credentials of international law-making?  
This article takes an initial step toward understanding if and how ICs improve or weaken 
the presence of democratic values in international law-making. In particular, the article 
scrutinizes one feature of the institutional design of ICs and asks what potential role it plays in 
democratizing international law-making. The design feature of interest in this article is access 
for transnational actors (TNAs). Following recent literature, I conceive of TNAs as “the broad 
range of private actors that organize and operate across state borders, including 
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nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy networks, social movements, party 
associations, philanthropic foundations, and transnational corporations,” among others.3 As an 
initial probe into the democratizing effects of international courts for international law-making, 
a focus on access is chosen for two reasons. First, existing literature highlights the relevance of 
TNA access to the democratic quality of global governance.4 Second, access is a feature of ICs 
that, as will be shown, applies to most international courts. This focus enables a discussion of 
the democratizing benefits to ICs in general, whereas other aspects of international courts 
require a case-by-case approach.  
By examining one institutional design feature of international courts, the article is a 
plausibility probe into whether the design of ICs may shape how ICs are able to render the 
making of international law more democratic. Even though judicial practices and outputs are 
relevant to this question, for the purposes of this article, I set them aside. My intention is not to 
exclude their relevance, but to hopefully begin a conversation by starting with institutional 
design.  
I argue that TNA access to ICs provides an institutional mechanism that can enhance 
participation and transparency in international law-making. The greater the opportunities are 
for TNAs to access international courts, the more potential it has to make international law-
making more inclusive and transparent. This argument combines normative and empirical 
analysis. Empirically, the article maps TNA access to ICs since 1945, documenting its 
expansion. The argument relies on a method of first identifying participation and transparency 
as values commonly featured by theories of democracy and then assesses if and how these 
values might be advanced by TNA access. Overall, the article offers a normative contribution 
by highlighting how access to international courts has the potential to render international law-
making more democratic, while also making an empirical contribution by mapping access to 
24 international courts. 
 I present this argument in four parts. First, the article explains why we need to include 
ICs when considering the democratic quality of international law-making, arguing that 
international courts play a key role in international law-making. The second part maps TNA 
access, illustrating that indeed access is a common feature of ICs today. The third part of the 
article identifies participation and transparency as democratic values commonly featured in 
theories of democracy. It considers how TNA access can potentially improve the presence of 
these values in ICs and their role in law-making. This part argues that access is most relevant 
for its ability to act as an institutional mechanism for participation and transparency in 
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international law-making. Fourth, the article concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
the argument for assessment of democratic deficits in international law-making. 
 
 
International Courts and Law-making 
 
It is widely accepted today that international courts are no longer inconsequential institutions.5  
They play important roles in global governance, 6  including law-making. While there is 
contention as to whether ICs should make law, “theoretical assertions that deny law-making 
power to international judicial bodies ignore the reality that…international courts…do play a 
major law-making role.”7 In what ways do ICs contribute to international law-making? There 
is certain inevitability to judge made law.8 As with any law, or system of rules, international 
law comprises abstract rules; it provides general prescriptions that cannot anticipate all possible 
circumstances to which they will apply. When asked to settle a dispute, ICs interpret the general 
rules and apply them to concrete cases. When doing so, they contribute to international law-
making through two modes – clarifying the meaning and scope of rules, and developing the law. 
First, ICs make law when they clarify the meaning and scope of rules as part of interpreting the 
rules and applying them. In other words, they fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in ways that 
stabilize normative expectations and give law more predictability.   
 The second mode through which ICs make law is through progressive development of 
the law. Unlike the process of clarifying legal rules, ICs can significantly change a rule in a way 
that fundamentally alters its interpretation and application. Progressive development occurs 
when a decision advances the law’s ability to address the changing conditions of international 
interactions. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda changed 
international criminal law by recognizing rape as an instrument of genocide.9  
 Developing the law occurs through three aspects of adjudication. First, ICs can at times 
be called upon to interpret the scope of legal rules. In this capacity, an IC can significantly 
extend the scope of a rule.  For example, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have asserted that laws of war apply 
to internal conflicts.10 Or, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has extended the scope of 
European Union law to include human rights. Second, ICs order rules. A central question 
frequently brought before courts pertains to which rules are superior. For example, do national 
laws trump international law? Similarly, ordering occurs when an IC determines whether a law 
is jus cogens or a customary law.  By determining a law is jus cogens, such as torture, the court 
4 
 
defines and develops the law such that the prohibition of torture is a supreme law. In other 
words, ICs define and develop the hierarchy of rules. Making these assessments, ICs change 
the ordering of principles in a way that significantly develops the law. Third, ICs determine 
how rules balance against one another in order to reconcile two conflicting rules. Balancing 
occurs both within a single legal regime and across legal regimes. An instance of the former is 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) pronouncements on how to balance the rights 
of one individual against those of another. In the latter case, ICs can adjudicate over a conflict 
between international trade law and international environmental law, for example, such as in 
the US-Shrimp dispute before the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body. 11 
Overall, ICs may significantly modify how rules are balanced, contributing to the development 
of the law.  
 Judicial decisions have law-making effects, even though they are typically not binding 
on anyone other than the parties to a dispute.  Judgments develop precedential value through 
legal argumentation, or by being treated as if they were precedent.  While varying in how 
elaborate their legal argumentation is and how extensively they draw upon previous decisions, 
most ICs refer to previous judicial decisions. 12  ICs use previous legal developments and 
perspectives of the law to develop a legal argument. Previous judicial rulings enhance the 
persuasiveness of an argument because they provide analogies, help to illustrate distinctions 
and patterns in meaning, and endorse certain perspectives or interpretations. ICs refer to their 
own previous decisions as well as the decisions of other ICs. 13  Thus, through legal 
argumentation, judgments of ICs have precedential effects, contributing to judicial law-making. 
 
 
TNA Access to International Courts  
 
Following previous research on TNA access, I conceive of TNA access as a dimension of the 
institutional design of international courts, which consists of the mechanisms whereby TNAs 
may take part in the judicial processes.14 Access to international institutions in general has been 
show to offer some promises for democratizing global governance.15 Similarly, access for 
transnational actors to ICs might render international law-making more democratic. This 
section identifies four types of access to international courts, defined as permanent international 
judicial bodies that meet the following criteria: (1) decide the question(s) brought before them 
on the basis of international law, (2) follow pre-determined rules of procedure, (3) issue legally 
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binding outcomes, (4) are composed of independent members, and (5) require at least one party 
to a dispute is a state or an international organization.16  
There are four types of TNA access to international courts: direct access, indirect access, 
third party access, and public observer access.  Direct access is governed by rules that grant 
TNAs privileges to directly file a petition to a court to have a complaint heard. Direct access 
enables individuals and groups, other than states or intergovernmental organs, the opportunity 
to litigate through an IC. Direct access is an important feature of more recently established 
ICs.17 Examples of ICs that grant direct access include the ECtHR and the Andean Tribunal of 
Justice. However, not all ICs feature direct access, including some recently established courts, 
such as the Permanent Review Tribunal of Mercosur. Direct access allows TNAs to file 
petitions, but it does not guarantee that their case will be heard on the merits. Rather, petitions 
are first assessed for admissibility.  
 The second type of access is indirect access. Indirect access is governed by rules that 
grant TNAs privileges to become a litigating party indirectly after another public authority 
brings their dispute to a court. One procedure that leads to indirect access is a referral by a 
national court. This is commonly found in regional trade courts and is exemplified by the ECJ’s 
preliminary reference procedure. Another indirect pathway is through an international 
commission, in combination with the acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction by the relevant 
member state. Such a procedure exists in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR). Also, there is the possibility 
that individual states recognize the right of individuals to directly petition a court. I treat these 
as indirect access because they require state acceptance separate from ratification of the 
contentious jurisdiction of the court. This applies to the ECtHR prior to 1998 and the ACtHPR.  
 Third, access to ICs transpires via rules that allow TNAs to participate in proceedings 
as a third party.18 Third parties can either be intervenors or amicus curiae. While the privileges 
of an intervenor are different from amicus, they are similar in that they offer a non-litigant the 
opportunity to voice their interests and present information to the court.19 Many ICs provide 
third party access, including the IACtHR, the ECJ, and the International Criminal Court.  
The fourth type of access is public observer access, which is regulated by provisions 
that detail whether IC’s oral proceedings are held in public. Public hearings allow TNAs to 
observe the oral proceedings of ICs. While seemingly insignificant, some ICs maintain closed 
proceedings, preventing all non-litigants from observing proceedings. Many ICs grant public 
observer access, but close proceedings to observers under limited exceptions. For example, 
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Article 46 of the ICJ Statute requires hearings are public “…unless the Court shall decide 
otherwise, or unless the parties demand that the public be not admitted.”20 
These types of access are intended to be “ideal types” for analytical purposes. In practice, 
however, access arrangements vary, as additional rules determine the details of access for each 
court. Nevertheless, the ideal types are informed by access that currently exists in ICs. Also, 
these types of access include only those that are officially recognized by court treaties or rules 
of procedure. Informal access, such as lobbying efforts, is excluded from my discussion because 
they are not dimensions of institutional design. However, informal access may have 
consequences for democratic deficits in international law-making.  
 How accessible are international courts? Which types of access do ICs feature? To 
answer these questions, I map TNA access to ICs over time based on an original dataset on the 
design of 24 international courts. The ICs included in this dataset comprise the full universe of 
permanent ICs that were operational at any point between 1945 until the end of 2014 (see 
appendix for a list). 21  Excluded are quasi-judicial bodies (such as the UN human rights 
committees), tribunals with ad hoc appointments (such as investor-state arbitration tribunals), 
hybrid criminal courts (such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone), or ICs that were “nipped in 
the bud.”22 This selection of ICs matches other prominent comparative research on international 
courts.23 TNA access is coded based on the rules provided in treaties and protocols establishing 
international courts, their rules of procedures as well as some case law that established new 
access measures (which applied only in a few instances). The data reflects changes in access 
during the life time of a court.  
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Figure 1 Development of Access from 1945 to 2014  
 
  
Figure 1 illustrates the development of access from 1945 to 2014. The figure shows access 
grows as the number of ICs increase.24 This suggests that the increase in access is largely due 
to the creation of new ICs and that newly founded ICs have access at their origin. Only six ICs 
experienced changes in access after establishment (see appendix). As shown, the most common 
form of access is public observer access. In 2014, 20 ICs operate with the general rule that oral 
proceedings are public. Exceptions to this include the WTO Appellate Body, the Benelux Court 
of Justice and the Mercosur Permanent Tribunal.25 The least common form of access is direct 
access.  In 2014, fifteen ICs provided direct access. Direct access is usually provided by regional 
trade courts, but the ECtHR also features this form of access. Also, these patterns are consistent 
over time. Direct access has been consistently the least common form of access, while public 
observer access has been the most common. 
 Table 1 illustrates the overall accessibility of ICs by cross-sections of time. In 2010 the 
majority of courts featured either three or four types of TNA access. Also in 2010, it was most 
common for ICs to feature all four types of access, while no ICs were completely closed. This 
is in contrast to 1995, when access was less common. More than one-third of all ICs in 1995 
0
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had either no access or only one type, and only two ICs featured all types of access. So, the 
proportion of ICs that offer no access or only one type of access has declined over the past 
twenty years, and the proportion with three or more types has increased. As mentioned, access 
rules have changed in a few ICs after their establishment. For example, third party access was 
introduced in the WTO AB in 2000 and the ECOWAS CJ was adapted in 2005 to include direct 
and indirect access.  
 
Table 1. Accessibility of ICs, by year 
 
Number of ICs  
 
Accessibility 1995 2000 2010 
No access 1 (7.7%) 0 0 
1 type of access 3 (28.1) 
4 
(23.5) 
5 
(20.8) 
2 types of access 2 (15.4) 
3 
(17.7) 
4 
(16.7) 
3 types of access 5 (38.5) 
5 
(29.4) 
6 
(25.0) 
All types of access 2 (15.4) 
5 
(29.4) 
9 
(37.5) 
N = 13 17 24 
 
 
 
Access to International Courts: Democratizing International Law-Making 
 
The data reveal TNA access has become commonplace feature of ICs. How can we evaluate 
the democratizing benefits of access to ICs? I follow a method adopted by recent research that 
merges normative theory with empirical research, 26  which first identifies values that are 
common to various theories and conceptions of democracy, and then assesses if and how these 
values are preserved in the empirical context. It should be noted that some theorists reject this 
approach, arguing that adding democratic values is not sufficient for democracy.27 I however 
do not claim that by enhancing the presence of certain values in international law-making it 
becomes democratic, but only that the presence of these values have potential to render 
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international law-making more democratic. Rather than highlighting a single model of 
democratic governance in this analysis, my argument builds on identifying values that are 
widely acknowledged as crucial to democratic governance and then asks if and how TNA access 
to ICs might better secure these values in international law-making.  
Participation and transparency are widely recognized as necessary (but not sufficient) 
values for democratic governance.  Three core models of democracy - participatory, 
representative, and deliberative democracy – highlight participation and transparency among 
the key criteria of democratic governance, albeit to varying degrees. Moreover, these two values 
can be identified in theories of democracy for the nation-state as well as for global governance.  
Participation is viewed as an essential democratic value by different strands of 
democratic theory.28 Most perspectives on democracy in global governance have suggested that 
participation and participatory mechanisms are crucial to global democratization.29  Despite 
notable differences, proponents of global deliberative democracy, global stakeholder 
democracy and global cosmopolitanism all recognize participation is essential to alleviating 
democratic deficits in global governance. Macdonald, presenting global stakeholder democracy, 
argues that “individuals should be entitled to participate in any decision-making that impacts in 
problematic ways upon their autonomous capacities.”30 Held, who presents ideas related to 
global cosmopolitanism, also emphasizes participation, arguing democratic order hinges on 
whether “citizens were able to enjoy a bundle of rights which allowed them to command 
democratic participation…” 31  Likewise, adherents of global deliberative democracy see 
participation as central to democratic authority. 32  In these various strands, participatory 
mechanisms are essential to making decision-making more inclusive of and responsive to 
affected people, even though it cannot be equated to electoral participation.   
Transparency is also generally viewed as an essential democratic value, and one that 
has potential to democratize global governance.33 Transparency is considered a crucial value 
for global democratization for several reasons. First, transparency is a cornerstone of 
participation. It plays an informational role that enables participation. Information asymmetries 
exist between the governing elites and the public. Simply put, the lack of information held by 
the public creates a de facto barrier to meaningful participation in global governance. 
Transparency mediates information asymmetries, transferring information available to elites to 
the public. With a more balanced distribution of information, the public is more readily 
equipped to participate. Second, transparency is a democratic value because of the ways in 
which it generates a public sphere of contestation. Transparency encourages public debate, and 
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opportunities for civil society to participate at the international level can act as a “transmission 
belt,” bringing international decision-making to the wider public.34  
Third, transparency enables those affected by transnational and national authority to 
scrutinize the exercise of that authority. In other words, it is a necessary (albeit insufficient) 
condition for accountability.35   Transparency for states alone is not adequate to meet the 
demands of accountability in global governance. If transparency is to provide for accountability, 
it must be directed to those who hold ICs to account and contest the terms of accountability.36 
While states can be accountability holders, they are not the only ones. Civil society can also 
hold authority to account. For this reason, transparency must be adequate enough to provide 
civil society with the information that would be necessary to exercise public scrutiny. As 
Buchanan and Keohane argue, “broad transparency” is needed, such that “information produced 
initially to enable institutionally designated accountability holders to assess officials’ 
performance may be appropriated by agents external to the institutions, such as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other transnational civil society, and used to 
support more fundamental criticism …”37 Thus transparency for external actors is essential to 
broad accountability, where the standards of accountability, the accountability holders and their 
interests, can be contested. For these reasons, institutional mechanisms of transparency are 
widely considered to be crucial to democratizing global governance, even though transparency 
may come with some costs.38 
Before proceeding, a few caveats must be mentioned. First, the argument does not 
assume that participation and transparency are sufficient remedies for democratic deficits. 
There may be other common values against which one could use to evaluate ICs in the 
democratizing of international law-making. For example, one might consider accountability or 
human rights. However the link between these values and TNA access to ICs is less clear, and 
arguably better associated with other design features of ICs (such as jurisdiction) or even 
judicial outputs. For this reason, I set aside these other values. Second, as will be explained 
further, additional factors condition the extent to which TNA access to ICs are mechanisms of 
participation and transparency. Third, TNA access to ICs alone cannot fully democratize 
international law-making. Rather, I take the view that ICs are part of a broader set of institutions 
and actors involved in law-making. In this sense, I generally subscribe to a “system approach.”39 
My argument, thus, only deals with one aspect of the overall system. Nevertheless, all else 
equal, TNA access to ICs has the potential to make international law-making more democratic 
than in its absence. Having identified important confines to my argument, I now turn to if and 
how TNA access to ICs might render international law-making more democratic.  
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Participation and TNA Access to ICs 
TNA access to ICs can provide an institutional mechanism for participation in 
international law-making. Access rules entitle TNAs, or those affected by international law, to 
participate in international judicial processes that shape the content of international law. While 
a full range of factors (such as epistemic and monetary resources) may determine whether TNAs 
actually participate, TNA access is the institutional pre-condition to participation. In other 
words, access provides the possibility of participation is law-making by ICs, and the absence 
of access prevents it.  
The entitlements provided by TNA access mechanisms should be viewed as more than 
mere token privileges to participate. Rather, access to ICs can provide democratizing benefits 
because it enables those affected to influence law-making. TNA access to ICs can foster 
participation that has an impact on judicial law-making in two ways. First, access to ICs enables 
TNA actors to influence an IC’s policy agenda, or the issues that are adjudicated. Specifically, 
direct and indirect access empowers TNAs, by acting as litigants, to influence what cases an 
IC hears because courts, unlike other political institutions, cannot pick the policy issues they 
consider. Rather, courts depend on cases to be brought to them, and their agendas are 
constructed primarily by what cases they receive. Thus, when TNAs are entitled to either 
directly or indirectly petition a court, they play a large role in determining what law and policy 
issues are on the court’s docket.   
Indeed, petitions brought to ICs by individuals and societal groups have transformed the 
agendas of ICs in several instances. For example, TNA access was instrumental in leading the 
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) to address unexpected policy issues. Despite a lack of 
explicit authority to do so, the EACJ addressed issues of human rights and environmental 
protection because of petitions brought to the Court by TNAs.40  Similarly, TNA access to the 
ECtHR contributed largely to questions of freedom of assembly and association.41  
Indirect access through referral procedures also enables TNAs to participate in ways 
that shape ICs’ agendas. For example, it is through the petition process at the Inter-American 
Human Rights system that territorial rights of indigenous peoples were placed on the agenda, 
even though they were previously not articulated in the Inter-American Human Rights 
Convention (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2010). Referrals to the ECJ lead 
the Court to adjudicate over women’s rights, and consequentially making gender equality a 
policy domain of the EU and the Court.42  
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These examples illustrate how the direct and indirect access provisions can translate into 
opportunities for TNAs to play a crucial role in determining what issues lay on the policy 
agenda of an IC. Access for TNAs contributes to an IC’s agenda in ways that states could not, 
or would not. Non-state litigants have incentives to bring claims against non-compliant states, 
whereas states have disincentives to do so. Concerns for retaliation and reputation can prevent 
states from filing claims against other states. Citizens, however, have incentives to do so, 
especially when social change is blocked through other pathways.43 Thus, direct and indirect 
access to ICs enables citizens to influence what issues are decided by ICs. 
Second, access to ICs enables TNAs to participate in ways that ensure deliberation and 
decision-making is informed by a range of societal views and interests. In other words, TNA 
access can improve the “discursive quality”44 of judicial deliberation and law-making. Direct, 
indirect, and third party access, in particular, are avenues through which TNAs’ perspectives 
enter into international judicial law-making. While these forms of access technically grant TNA 
actors opportunity to present both factual information and legal arguments, as opposed to raw 
opinion, they nevertheless can be a means by which a court obtains information about the 
perspectives of those affected or interested in any given dispute. These forms of access 
introduce societal perspectives or discourses that would otherwise not enter into judicial law-
making. States do not have an obligation to provide a fair representation of societal perspectives, 
or even some notion of the public interest, in their argumentation before an IC, nor do they have 
interests to do so. Additionally, courts are not representative institutions because of the 
requirements of independence and impartiality. 45  So they are not designed to incorporate 
diverse perspectives and interests through the individuals who sit on the bench. Thus, TNA 
access is crucial to broadening the scope of perspectives and interests that enter into 
international judicial deliberation.  
Direct and indirect access ensures that at least one societal perspective – that of the non-
state litigant – is taken into account when deliberating and deciding a dispute. More important, 
however, is whether a broader set of perspectives or discourses may be included in the process. 
For this reason, third-party access can play an especially vital role. For example, Williams and 
Woolaver find that “Amicus curiae can be very useful in ensuring that the perspective of these 
groups [victims and groups within society] is heard” during international criminal court 
proceedings.46  Without such opportunities to participate, the discourses present in judicial 
deliberation are only guaranteed to be that of the complainant and the respondent.  
Some may argue that access to ICs does not ensure equal participation or that the access 
provided to international courts does not guarantee that those who participate have strong 
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democratic credentials. Opponents of access claim that those who participate will tend to 
represent special interests, not public interests. For example, Trachtman and Moremen argue 
that TNAs who participate in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism are biased stakeholders 
and not representative voices.47 Recent evidence, however, shows there is more diversity of 
interests represented than Trachtman and Moremen suggest.48 Also, Williams and Woolaver 
respond to similar criticisms when assessing amicus curiae before international criminal 
tribunals, and argue that most often the biases of amici are obvious and judges make 
independent assessments as to the value of their contribution. They find that “the risk of courts 
becoming battlegrounds for interest groups has not been realized before international criminal 
courts to date.”49 I would similarly argue that the forms of access that are provided by ICs are 
not unrestrained. Judges have the discretion to determine inadmissible claims, to not grant leave 
for amicus submissions, and to ultimately reject information that appears to be biased or 
irrelevant. In addition, the solution to capture of ICs by special interests does not lie with the 
exclusion of societal participants, but rather their inclusion more broadly. In line with 
Madison’s well-known argument in the Federalist Paper #10, interests are best balanced against 
one another and merit more inclusion, rather than less.  
Participation that is generated by TNA access is not without imperfections. This form 
of participation is not equivalent to electoral participation or participation associated with direct 
democracy. Those who can participate, either for formal reasons such as meeting the criteria of 
having standing in legal proceedings, or informal requirements such as financial resources, are 
limited. The participation that is provided may more closely resemble unelected or informal 
representation.50 Yet, even if we view TNA access to ICs as only providing representation, by 
actors who makes “representative claims,” there may still be good reason to view it as on 
balance more democratic by allowing for inclusion or representation of more views than in its 
absence.   
Despite shortcomings, access to international courts offers those affected more voice in 
the making of international law, and thereby may push international law-makers to be more 
responsive to those governed, than in its absence. TNA access to ICs serves as an institutional 
mechanism of participation, albeit an imperfect one. It provides those affected with greater 
capacity to shape the policy agenda of ICs. Also, access allows TNAs to influence the discursive 
quality of judicial deliberation and law-making by enabling more perspectives and interests to 
enter into the judicial process. The various forms of access provide the potential for 
participation, and thus might reduce democratic deficits – albeit to different degrees. Access 
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has the greatest potential to democratize international law-making when its several forms are 
offered at the same time.  
 
 
Transparency and TNA Access to ICs 
 TNA access to ICs provides a transparency mechanism in international law-making.  As 
the empirical data reveal, most ICs provide public observer access, meaning that they operate 
with the general rule that oral proceedings will occur in open court, with the exception that they 
can be closed on account of accentuating circumstances. Public observer access, at a minimum, 
ensures that oral proceedings of a court are open to interested TNAs. This type of access can 
enable greater participation of the public, either directly or indirectly. For example, an 
organization that observes the hearings may find that the issues at hand relate to their interests, 
and may then seek to participate through more participatory channels to air their views. Through 
public proceedings, civil society gains valuable information concerning the issues and interests 
at stake in a legal dispute, as well as a sense of the legal problems and arguments surrounding 
a conflict. Similarly, access to proceedings may simply lead individuals to discuss the issue at 
hand in public fora. The ability for one or two individuals or groups to observe proceedings can 
have an impact on how seemingly remote and insular legal processes connect to wider public 
audiences, and become the focus of political discourse.  
 This is not to imply that judges should make their own internal deliberations public, and 
that all aspects of the written proceedings must be publicly accessible. It is possible to ensure 
greater transparency, while still valuing the obligations and rights that are furnished by 
confidentiality.51 Some transparency after the fact may be able to harness some of the benefits 
of transparency when we speak of courts.52  
Access increases transparency to a greater extent when we consider other forms of 
access, including direct, indirect, and third party access. Direct access as well as some forms of 
third party access supplies additional transparency. Access as a litigant comes with full 
privileges to written and oral proceedings. Similarly, indirect access requires transparency for 
effective and fair judicial process. Likewise, some forms of third party access would also entail 
having written proceedings being made readily available. These forms of access translate into 
transparency for those directly involved, and can contribute to broader transparency when 
involved TNAs transmit information to the wider public. For example, the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) has acted as an amicus before the WTO dispute panels before. As a consequence the 
WWF published information on the dispute to its members and on the Internet. Through this 
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process, the issue then is transferred to the public sphere. As Bogdandy and Venzke argue, 
amicus “might be able to trigger processes of scandalisation that contribute to discussions and 
mobilize the general public.” 53  While access may enable transparency and a subsequent 
heightening of public discourse around international courts, there may be a subsequent feedback 
effect where the IC is sensitized to the public discourse on the topic.  As Eckersley explains, 
amicus submissions contribute to a public sphere around the WTO, “sensitizing the trade regime 
to the wider concerns of transnational civil society and thereby narrow the external 
accountability gap.”54  
 The transparency that access offers is far from perfect. Indeed, the judicial deliberation 
does not transpire in an open forum, creating limits to what access can do for transparency. 
Nevertheless, access enhances the possibility of transparency in a way that is better than in its 
absence. Indeed, the temporal patterns illustrate that in some international courts, hearings are 
closed to the public. Moreover, TNA access is not the only means of ensuring transparency to 
international law-making by ICs.  For example, rules may require that ICs make their judgments 
public. 
To review, access to international courts may secure democratizing benefits to 
international law-making by fostering greater transparency. Specifically, transparency has the 
potential to boost participation, accountability, and a public sphere around international 
adjudication and law-making. The various forms of access offer promise for transparency. The 
greatest promise for more transparency, like participation, would arise from a combination of 
different types of access. ICs that are designed to grant especially third-party access and public 
observer access would seem to hold the greatest transparency mechanisms and thus 
democratizing benefits. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article aims to bring international courts into the conversation on the democratic quality 
of international law-making. It argues that ICs are law-making institutions and should be given 
greater consideration when speaking of international law-making. I propose that international 
courts in their law-making role have significance for assessments of democratic deficits. 
Specifically, TNA access, a common institutional feature of international courts, has the 
potential to render international law-making more democratic than in its absence. Mapping 
access to international courts, this article shows that TNA access to ICs has expanded since 
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1945. The expansion of TNA access has provided additional institutional mechanisms for 
participation and transparency – two widely recognized democratic values – in international 
law-making. This argument resonates with extant literature that links TNA access to global 
governance with global democratization.  
The democratizing effects generated by TNA access to ICs, however, are conditioned 
by various factors. I have explained how the various types of access have different impacts on 
participation and transparency and that the more access TNAs have to ICs the greater the 
potential impact. Two other considerations are likely to condition the potential democratizing 
effects of TNA access to ICs. First, there is significant variation among ICs in terms of their 
jurisdiction as well as their influence over international law. Second, not all TNAs are the same, 
NGOs, thinks-tanks, and individuals, for example, may differ in their material and epistemic 
resources, and thus they are unlikely to use access to similar degrees or even in similar ways. 
All of these factors condition the extent to which TNA access has democratizing effects on law-
making through ICs. Nevertheless, on the whole TNA access to ICs has the potential to make 
international law-making more democratic than in its absence – albeit to varying degrees 
depending on the types of access featured, the nature of an IC’s jurisdiction and who has access. 
Taking the perspective that, on the one hand, ICs are part of a broader system of law-making 
and, on the other hand, global democratization is a process that has only begun,55 TNA access 
to ICs moves us forward in this process.  
This article has implications for three debates. First, when considering the democratic 
quality of international law-making ICs are relevant. International courts are de facto part of 
the making of international law, despite whether one believes they should be and despite the 
hesitance of states to admit that they have such a role. For this reason, ICs as lawmakers merit 
normative consideration. While I have focused on the democratizing effects of access for 
international law-making, other design features of international courts may either dampen or 
intensify democratic deficits. 56  Second, this article suggests that international law-making 
today takes on dynamics that differ from our traditional assumptions. When considering 
democratic deficits in international law-making, these new dynamics are relevant yet 
unexplored. For example, treaty making today involves a wide-range of transnational actors.57 
If, how, and when the broader dynamics of international law-making effects global 
democratization begs consideration. This article suggests we look at how features of law-
making processes dampen or intensify democratic deficits. Third, literature on the democratic 
deficits in global governance has largely neglected international courts.  They however deserve 
more attention in the debates concerning democracy in international law-making and global 
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governance. The ways in which ICs can dampen and exacerbate democratic deficits are 
potentially plentiful but little understood. This article is a start to a hopefully broader discussion 
on ICs in global democratization.  
  
18 
 
Appendix 
International Court 
Year in 
Operation Changes in access 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACtHPR) 2006 None 
Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) 1984 Yes (third party access added in 2001) 
Benelux Court of Justice  (BCJ) 1974 None 
Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) 1992 None 
Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) 2005 None 
Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community Court of Justice (CEMAC CJ) 2000 None 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 1952 Yes (direct, third party, and public 
access added in 1957) 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa Court of Justice  (COMESA CJ) 1998 None 
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) 2001 None 
Economic Court of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (ECCIS)   1993 None 
Economic Community of West African States 
Court of Justice (ECOWAS CJ) 2002 
Yes (direct and indirect party access 
added in 2005 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 1959 
Yes (third party access added in 
1981, direct access added in 1998, 
indirect access removed in 1998) 
European Free Trade Agreement Court of Justice 
(EFTA CJ) 1994 None 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) 1979 
Yes (third party access added in 
1982) 
International Criminal Court (ICC) 2002 None 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) 1947 None 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 
(ICTR) 1994 None 
International Criminal Tribunal of the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) 1993 None 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea  
(ITLOS) 1996 None 
Mercosur Permanent Review Tribunal 
(Mercosur PRT) 2002 None 
Organization for the Harmonization of Business 
Law in Africa Common Court of Justice and 
Arbitration (OHADA CCJA) 
1996 None 
Tribunal of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADCT) 2005-2010 None 
Western African Economic and Monetary Union 
Court of Justice (WAEMU CJ) 1995 None 
World Trade Organization Appellate Body 
(WTO AB) 1994 
Yes (third party access added in 
1998) 
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